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Is the Financial Crisis Causing a Recession? 
John A. Tatom  
 
It’s official, the U.S. entered a recession a year ago in December 2007.  The National 
Bureau of Economic Research, the official arbiter for dating business cycle 
developments, announced on December 6, 2008 that the economy had reached a peak in 
December 2007, following a long expansion that began in November 2001. Coming in 
train with a foreclosure crisis that began in late 2006 and its associated financial crisis 
that began in August 2007, there is a tendency for analysts to attribute the recession to the 
financial crisis. Did the extreme conditions in financial markets since September 2008 
cause and/or worsen the recession, or were there other causes?  Knowing the cause(s) of 
the current recession could be essential to determining how much longer and deeper the 
current recession could be.  
 
 The worst aspects of the financial crisis that attract attention today did not begin until 
September 2008, when credit markets were said to seize up or freeze, according to the 
metaphor of the moment, and several financial institutions, mainly investment banks and 
not commercial banks, failed.  This was well after the recession actually began and so is a 
poor culprit for the cause of the latest recession. Perhaps the latest worsening of the 
financial crisis is a cause of recession, however, and will extend the current one, caused 
by other factors well into the future.  On the other hand, other factors that might account 
for the recession, or even factors related to the financial crisis, could portend the 
imminent end to the current recession.  
 
Did the Federal Reserve cause the recession?        
A leading candidate for the cause of the current recession is the Federal Reserve (Fed). 
The Fed has caused every post-world war II recession, according to most experts, 
especially Milton Friedman.  For example, this conclusion is explained in the leading 
college money and banking textbook, Mishkin (2004). According to this view, every 
recession over the period has been associated with a sharp slowing in money growth and 
every sharp slowing in money growth has been followed or accompanied by recession. 
The latest recession is no different.  In late 2006 there already were signs of a sharp 
slowing in money growth in place portending recession; see Tatom (2006). This slowing 
only got worse and lasted until September 2008. The foreclosure crisis was reinforced by 
the slowing in money growth that also ended the rapid appreciation which investors had 
counted on to make their housing investments profitable.  Moreover, monetary slowing 
also tightened credit growth for housing purchases, making it more difficult for existing 
owners to refinance and for new purchasers to obtain credit to buy houses.  
 
Figure 1 shows the growth rate of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ measure of 
the monetary base, adjusted for reserve requirement changes, since 1960 along with the 
growth rate of nominal gross domestic product (GDP). The adjusted monetary base is the 
purest measure of the Fed’s influence on the stock of money in the economy. It consists 
of the currency and financial institutions’ reserves. Both growth rates are measured over 
four quarter periods or year-over-year.  The general picture is that the monetary base 
slows before or during every major slowing in GDP.     
 
Figure 1  
Monetary growth has slowed sharply 
Monetary base growth has been increasingly tighter since 2006
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
19
60
Q1
19
61
Q3
19
63
Q1
19
64
Q3
19
66
Q1
19
67
Q3
19
69
Q1
19
70
Q3
19
72
Q1
19
73
Q3
19
75
Q1
19
76
Q3
19
78
Q1
19
79
Q3
19
81
Q1
19
82
Q3
19
84
Q1
19
85
Q3
19
87
Q1
19
88
Q3
19
90
Q1
19
91
Q3
19
93
Q1
19
94
Q3
19
96
Q1
19
97
Q3
19
99
Q1
20
00
Q3
20
02
Q1
20
03
Q3
20
05
Q1
20
06
Q3
20
08
Q1
Pe
rc
en
t (
Ye
ar
/Y
ea
r)
GDP
Monetary 
Base
 
    Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis  
 
The monetary base has been slowing since mid-2002, but the tightening became most 
noticeable in 2006 and subsequently when the pace of growth began to slow to the lowest 
rates observed since the early 1960s.  The slowing continued until monetary base growth 
reached a mere 1.1 percent rate of growth in the second quarter of 2008. The growth rate 
of other monetary aggregates shows the same slowing. The measure of money used for 
purchases of goods, services and assets, called M1, adjusted for sweep balances that 
would have otherwise been held in M1, slowed from over 8 percent in 2004 to about 2.5 
percent in most of 2005 and has been below 2 percent in 2007-08, until the third quarter 
of 2008.  The pace of M1 growth has been the slowest since the slowing that caused the 
1990-91 and 1960-61 recessions. The figure shows that monetary base growth 
accelerated in the third quarter of 2008, but all of this increase came in the last two weeks 
of the quarter when the Fed began to aggressively increase its total assets.  Since early 
September 2008, the Fed has more than doubled its total assets and the monetary base in 
an effort to boost total credit in the economy.   
 
Note that monetary base growth continued to slow from an already recessionary pace 
during the first year of the financial crisis that began in August 2007, despite its rhetoric 
that it was attempting to stimulate the economy by lowering the federal funds rate target 
and by unprecedented private credit provisions.  Unfortunately those provisions came at 
the expense of the credit the Fed provides to the federal government through purchases of 
government securities. 
 
The slowing in nominal GDP growth began in late 2006 when it was about 6.8 percent 
and fell to 3.4 percent in the third quarter of 2008. Real GDP growth follows a similar 
slowing pattern (not shown).  A key feature of Figure 1 is that monetary base growth has 
finally accelerated. With a lead of two to three quarters, given the size of the recent surge 
in money growth, nominal and real GDP growth can be expected to accelerate, ignoring 
other factors that might deepen and lengthen the recession.  To the extent that the 
recession is largely due to monetary policy, it should end soon if the Fed continues to 
pursue the rapid monetary growth that it began in September 2008.  
 
An oil price shock worsened the recession 
The recent recession has also been influenced by sharp increase in oil prices in 2007-08 
that raised the relative price of energy.  Figure 2 shows an index of the relative price of 
energy constructed as the logarithm of the producer price index for fuel power and related 
products deflated by the personal consumption expenditure deflator and set to one in 
1973. The vertical measure equals the continuous percentage change since 1973 and 
vertical measures are comparable.  The relative price of energy has been rising generally 
since early 1999, but there have been intermittent periods of significant decline. From the 
end of 2006 to the third quarter of 2008, the relative price of energy rose 41.6 percent.  
This can be compared with a 54 percent rise over the nine quarter period I/1979-II/1981, 
which played a significant role in the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions. The first energy price 
shock, which was associated with the 1973-75 recession, was closer in magnitude, but 
occurred much more quickly; the relative price of energy rose 40.6 percent from III/1973 
to III/1974.  
 
Figure 2 
Energy prices surged temporarily in 2007-08 
The relative price of energy
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      Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
The energy price shock is a likely culprit for the recent recession, but there are some 
major qualifications.  First, the surge in energy prices in 2007 came on the heels of a 
significant decline in 2006 so that energy prices were less than one percent higher at the 
end of 2007 than they had been at the end of 2005, despite a 17.5 percent rise in 2006. 
The swing in prices, as well as the size of the increase in 2007, suggested that energy 
prices were not contributing to a recession up until that time (see Tatom 2008). Over the 
next two quarters, however, energy prices continued to surge, rising another 23 percent, a 
pace that was clearly recessionary in earlier episodes. Thus, energy prices would not have 
likely caused the recession that began in late 2007, but it did make it worse or deeper, and 
it very likely lengthened it.  
 
What is not shown in Figure 2 is that oil and energy prices have fallen sharply since their 
peaks in July 2008.  By October, energy prices had returned to their level at the end of 
2007 and further reductions are certain to wipe out most of the rise in energy prices since 
the end of 2003. Thus, like the monetary policy influence, the energy price shock 
influence on the recession is in the process of rapidly disappearing and reversing. 
 
An earlier parallel for a sharp run up and then decline in oil prices occurred in 1990.  
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, oil and energy prices spiked up, with oil 
prices actually rising 154.9 percent from July to October 1990. Subsequently, oil prices 
fell back 54.2 percent so that by March 1991, the business cycle trough month, oil prices 
were only 16 percent higher than before the invasion. So it took an oil price reversal for 
only 5 months from October to March to end the recession. Oil prices are falling faster in 
the current recession from their peak in July 2008. 
 
The 1990-91 energy price shock was the first on many episodes that are relevant for 
energy price shocks since then.  In the 1970s and 1980s, major energy price shocks were 
permanent, in the sense that they did not quickly reverse. If prices rose sharply (1973-74 
and 1979-81), they did not fall off as sharply and immediately.  If energy prices fell 
sharply (1986), they did not rebound immediately and as much. Since the mid-1990s 
there have been several episodes of sharp increases and decreases in energy prices, 
generally larger than 20 percent in absolute value and lasting usually one to two years. In 
other words, large enough to have noticeable effects on output and inflation, but not 
usually fully permanent.  The table shows these periods drawn from Figure 2.        
 
Table 
Major Moves in energy prices: 1997-2008 
Period length Period Percent change* 
2 years I/1997-I/1999 -27.1% 
2 years I/1999-I/2001                   51.9 
1 year I/2001-I/2002                  -37.0 
1 year I/2002-I/2003                   31.0 
3 quarters I/2003-IV/2003                    -7.1 
2 years IV/2003-IV/2005                    42.8 
1 year IV/2005-IV/2006                   -16.7 
7 quarters IV/2006-III/2008 41.6 
 
 
When will the current recession end? 
The perspective here is optimistic.  If the Fed caused the current recession and energy 
prices made it worse and longer, and if there were no other factors influencing it, then a 
quick end could be in sight, in the first or second quarter of 2009.  In the first instance, 
the recession would match the length of the longest post-world war II recessions in 1973-
75 and 1981-82 recessions.  However, the influence of the financial crisis has not been 
taken into account. So far there is no strong evidence that credit has declined more than 
monetary policy alone might suggest.  Nor has there been deterioration on the equity of 
the banking system that might induce a deleveraging process as significant as many 
analysts have suggested. If financial conditions deteriorate substantially, however, despite 
the Fed’s dramatic actions from September 2008 to December 2008, then the recession 
that has had other causes so far would take on a new character.   
 
Even in the best case, that the economy follows a pattern somewhat similar to the end of 
the 1990-91 recession, one should keep in mind that, while the recession ended in March 
1991, the recovery was slow, so slow that it was referred to as the “jobless recovery.”  
From the first quarter of 1991 to the third quarter of 1992, the growth rate of real GDP 
was only 3.1 percent, relatively low for the first six quarters following a recession. The 
unemployment rate of 6.8 percent at the end of the recession in March 1991 actually rose 
to 7.8 percent 15 months later in July 1992.   
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